- Table View
- List View
Biology, History, and Natural Philosophy
by Allen D. Breck and Wolfgang YourgrauIn a world that peers over the brink of disaster more often than not it is difficult to find specific assignments for the scholarly community. One speaks of peace and brotherhood only to realize that for many the only real hope of making a contribution may seem to be in a field of scientific specialization seemingly irrelevant to social causes and problems. Yet the history of man since the beginnings of science in the days of the Greeks does not support this gloomy thesis. Time and again we have seen science precipitate social trends or changes in the humanistic beliefs that have a significant effect on the scientific community. Not infrequently the theoretical scientist, triggered by society's changing goals and understandings, finds ultimate satisfaction in the work of his colleagues in engineering and the other applied fields. Thus the major debate in mid-nineteenth century in which the evidence of natural history and geology at variance with the Biblical feats provided not only courage to a timid Darwin but the kind of audience that was needed to fit his theories into the broad public dialogue on these topics. The impact of "Darwinism" was felt far beyond the scientific community. It affected social thought, upset religious certainties and greatly affected the teaching of science.
Biology, History, and Natural Philosophy: Based on the Second International Colloquium held at the University of Denver
by Allen D. Breck and Wolfgang YourgrauIn a world that peers over the brink of disaster more often than not it is difficul t to find specific assignments for the scholarly community. One speaks of peace and brotherhood only to realize that for many the only real hope of making a contribution may seem to be in a field of scientific specialization seemingly irrelevant to social causes and problems. Yet the history of man since the beginnings of science in the days of the Greeks does not support this gloomy thesis. Time and again we have seen science precipitate social trends or changes in the humanistic beliefs that have a significant effect on. the scientific community. Not infrequently the theoretical scientist, triggered by society's changing goals and understandings, finds ultimate satisfaction in the work of his colleagues in engineering and the other applied fields. Thus the major debate in mid-nineteenth century in which the evidence of natural history and geology at variance with the Biblical feats provided not only courage to a timid Darwin but the kind of audience that was needed to fit his theories into the broad public dialogue on these topics. The impact of "Darwinism" was felt far beyond the scientific community. It affected social thought, upset religious certainties and greatly affected the teaching of science.
Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors (Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook #18)
by Sabine Maasen E. Mendelsohn P. Weingartnot lie in the conceptual distinctions but in the perceived functions of metaphors and whether in the concrete case they are judged positive or negative. The ongoing debates reflect these concerns quite clearly~ namely that metaphors are judged on the basis of supposed dangers they pose and opportunities they offer. These are the criteria of evaluation that are obviously dependent on the context in which the transfer of meaning occurs. Our fundamental concern is indeed the transfer itself~ its prospects and its limits. Looking at possible functions of metaphors is one approach to under standing and elucidating sentiments about them. The papers in this volume illustrate, by quite different examples, three basic functions of metaphors: illustrative, heuristic~ and constitutive. These functions rep resent different degrees of transfer of meaning. Metaphors are illustrative when they are used primarily as a literary device, to increase the power of conviction of an argument, for example. Although the difference between the illustrative and the heuristic function of metaphors is not great, it does exist: metaphors are used for heuristic purposes whenever "differences" of meaning are employed to open new perspectives and to gain new insights. In the case of "constitutive" metaphors they function to actually replace previous meanings by new ones. Sabine Maasen in her paper introduces the distinction between transfer and transforma tion.
Biology As Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA (The CBC Massey Lectures)
by Richard LewontinR. C. Lewontin is a prominent scientist -- a geneticist who teaches at Harvard -- yet he believes that we have placed science on a pedestal, treating it as an objective body of knowledge that transcends all other ways of knowing and all other endeavours.Lewontin writes in this collection of essays, which began their life as CBC Radio's Massey Lectures Series for 1990: "Scientists do not begin life as scientists, after all, but as social beings immersed in a family, a state, a productive structure, and they view nature through a lens that has been molded by their social experience… . Science, like the Church before it, is a supremely social institution, reflecting and reinforcing the dominant values and vices of society at each historical epoch."In Biology as Ideology Lewontin examines the false paths down which modern scientific ideology has led us. By admitting science's limitations, he helps us rediscover the richness of nature -- and appreciate the real value of science.
Biology and Subjectivity: Philosophical Contributions to Non-reductive Neuroscience (Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action #2)
by Miguel García-Valdecasas José Ignacio Murillo Nathaniel F. BarrettSome may consider that the language and concepts of philosophy will eventually be superseded by those of neuroscience. This book questions such a naïve assumption and through a variety of perspectives and traditions, the authors show the possible contributions of philosophy to non-reductive forms of neuroscientific research. Drawing from the full range and depth of philosophical thought, from hylomorphism to ethics, by way of dynamical systems, enactivism and value theory, amongst other topics, this edited work promotes a rich form of interdisciplinary exchange.Chapters explore the analytic, phenomenological and pragmatic traditions of philosophy, and most share a common basis in the Aristotelian tradition. Contributions address one or more aspects of subjectivity in relation to science, such as the meaning and scope of naturalism and the place of consciousness in nature, or the relation between intentionality, teleology, and causality. Readers may further explore the nature of life and its relation to mind and then the role of value in mind and nature.This book shows how philosophy might contribute to real explanatory progress in science while remaining faithful to the full complexity of the phenomena of life and mind. It will be of interest to both philosophers and neuroscientists, as well as those engaged in interdisciplinary cooperation between philosophy and science.
Biology and Politics: The Cutting Edge (Research in Biopolitics #9)
by Albert Somit Steven A. PetersonThis volume examines cutting edge research in the study of biology and politics. Following an introduction from the editors it is divided into two main sections. The first part of the book explores the linkage between evolution, genetics and politics with initial chapters on abandoned baby legislation, a model of action and norms, and the biopolitics of primates. The next four chapters have a special focus on the use of twin studies to study political phenomena and provide a biological critique of twin studies, phenotypic measurement issues and twin studies, a survey of twin studies research, and an example of using twin studies to explore politically relevant behaviour. The second section looks at the relationship of brain science to our understanding of politics. With respect to the applicability of brain science it features chapters summarizing what literature exists as well as how to use neuroimaging techniques to study political behaviour.
Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins
by Denis R. Alexander Ronald L. NumbersOver the course of human history, the sciences, and biology in particular, have often been manipulated to cause immense human suffering. For example, biology has been used to justify eugenic programs, forced sterilization, human experimentation, and death camps—all in an attempt to support notions of racial superiority. By investigating the past, the contributors to Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins hope to better prepare us to discern ideological abuse of science when it occurs in the future. Denis R. Alexander and Ronald L. Numbers bring together fourteen experts to examine the varied ways science has been used and abused for nonscientific purposes from the fifteenth century to the present day. Featuring an essay on eugenics from Edward J. Larson and an examination of the progress of evolution by Michael J. Ruse, Biology and Ideology examines uses both benign and sinister, ultimately reminding us that ideological extrapolation continues today. An accessible survey, this collection will enlighten historians of science, their students, practicing scientists, and anyone interested in the relationship between science and culture.
Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins
by Denis R. Alexander Ronald L. NumbersOver the course of human history, the sciences, and biology in particular, have often been manipulated to cause immense human suffering. For example, biology has been used to justify eugenic programs, forced sterilization, human experimentation, and death camps—all in an attempt to support notions of racial superiority. By investigating the past, the contributors to Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins hope to better prepare us to discern ideological abuse of science when it occurs in the future. Denis R. Alexander and Ronald L. Numbers bring together fourteen experts to examine the varied ways science has been used and abused for nonscientific purposes from the fifteenth century to the present day. Featuring an essay on eugenics from Edward J. Larson and an examination of the progress of evolution by Michael J. Ruse, Biology and Ideology examines uses both benign and sinister, ultimately reminding us that ideological extrapolation continues today. An accessible survey, this collection will enlighten historians of science, their students, practicing scientists, and anyone interested in the relationship between science and culture.
Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins
by Denis R. Alexander Ronald L. NumbersOver the course of human history, the sciences, and biology in particular, have often been manipulated to cause immense human suffering. For example, biology has been used to justify eugenic programs, forced sterilization, human experimentation, and death camps—all in an attempt to support notions of racial superiority. By investigating the past, the contributors to Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins hope to better prepare us to discern ideological abuse of science when it occurs in the future. Denis R. Alexander and Ronald L. Numbers bring together fourteen experts to examine the varied ways science has been used and abused for nonscientific purposes from the fifteenth century to the present day. Featuring an essay on eugenics from Edward J. Larson and an examination of the progress of evolution by Michael J. Ruse, Biology and Ideology examines uses both benign and sinister, ultimately reminding us that ideological extrapolation continues today. An accessible survey, this collection will enlighten historians of science, their students, practicing scientists, and anyone interested in the relationship between science and culture.
Biology and Criminology: The Biosocial Synthesis (Routledge Advances in Criminology)
by Anthony WalshNumerous criminologists have noted their dissatisfaction with the state of criminology. The need for a new paradigm for the 21st century is clear. However, many distrust biology as a factor in studies of criminal behavior, whether because of limited exposure or because the orientation of criminology in general has a propensity to see it as racist, classist, or at least illiberal. This innovative new book by noted criminologist Anthony Walsh dispels such fears, examining how information from the biological sciences strengthens criminology work and both complements and improves upon traditional theories of criminal behavior. With its reasoned case for biological science as a fundamental tool of the criminologist, Walsh's groundbreaking work will be required reading for all students and faculty within the field of criminology.
Biology and Criminology: The Biosocial Synthesis (Routledge Advances in Criminology)
by Anthony WalshNumerous criminologists have noted their dissatisfaction with the state of criminology. The need for a new paradigm for the 21st century is clear. However, many distrust biology as a factor in studies of criminal behavior, whether because of limited exposure or because the orientation of criminology in general has a propensity to see it as racist, classist, or at least illiberal. This innovative new book by noted criminologist Anthony Walsh dispels such fears, examining how information from the biological sciences strengthens criminology work and both complements and improves upon traditional theories of criminal behavior. With its reasoned case for biological science as a fundamental tool of the criminologist, Walsh's groundbreaking work will be required reading for all students and faculty within the field of criminology.
Biologie und Philosophie
by Max HartmannDieser Buchtitel ist Teil des Digitalisierungsprojekts Springer Book Archives mit Publikationen, die seit den Anfängen des Verlags von 1842 erschienen sind. Der Verlag stellt mit diesem Archiv Quellen für die historische wie auch die disziplingeschichtliche Forschung zur Verfügung, die jeweils im historischen Kontext betrachtet werden müssen. Dieser Titel erschien in der Zeit vor 1945 und wird daher in seiner zeittypischen politisch-ideologischen Ausrichtung vom Verlag nicht beworben.
Biological Robustness: Emerging Perspectives from within the Life Sciences (History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences #23)
by Marta Bertolaso Silvia Caianiello Emanuele SerrelliThis volume reviews examples and notions of robustness at several levels of biological organization. It tackles many philosophical and conceptual issues and casts an outlook on the future challenges of robustness studies in the context of a practice-oriented philosophy of science. The focus of discussion is on concrete case studies. These highlight the necessity of a level-dependent description of robust biological behaviors.Experts from the neurosciences, biochemistry, ecology, biology, and the history and the philosophy of life sciences provide a multiplex perspective on the topic. Contributions span from protein folding, to cell-level robustness, to organismal and developmental robustness, to sensorimotor systems, up to the robustness of ecological systems.Several chapters detail neurobiological case-studies. The brain, the poster child of plasticity in biology, offers multiple examples of robustness. Neurobiology explores the importance of temporal organization and multiscalarity in making this robustness-with-plasticity possible. The discussion also includes structures well beyond the brain, such as muscles and the complex feedback loops involved in the peculiar robustness of music perception. Overall, the volume grounds general reflections upon concrete case studies, opening to all the life sciences but also to non-biological and bio-inspired fields such as post-modern engineering. It will appeal to researchers, students, as well as non-expert readers.
Biological Naturalism and the Mind-Body Problem
by Jane AndersonThis book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand “the mind-body problem”. The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as “what it is like” to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of “what-it-is-like” as “the hard problem” of consciousness and claims that this problem is so “hard” that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally nothing to investigate – that phenomenal experience is illusory. This book contends that phenomenal experience is both very real and very important. Two specific “biological naturalist” views are considered in depth. One of these two views, in particular, seems to be free from problems; adopting something along the lines of this view might finally allow us to make sense of the mind-body problem.An essential read for anyone who believes that no satisfactory solution to “the mind-body problem” has yet been discovered.
Biological Models via Interval Type-2 Fuzzy Sets (SpringerBriefs in Mathematics)
by Rosana Sueli Jafelice Ana Maria Amarillo BertoneThis book offers a gentle introduction to type-2 fuzzy sets and, in particular, interval type-2 fuzzy sets and their application in biological modeling. Interval type-2 fuzzy modeling is a comparatively recent direction of research in fuzzy modeling. As the modeling of biological problems is inherently uncertain, the use of fuzzy sets in this field is a natural choice.The coverage begins with a succinct review of type-1 fuzzy basic theory, before providing a comprehensive and didactic explanation of type-2 fuzzy set components. In turn, Fuzzy Rule-Based Systems, or FRBS, are shown for both types, interval type-2 and type-1 fuzzy sets.Applications include the pharmacological models, prediction of prostate cancer stages, a model for HIV population transfer (asymptomatic to symptomatic), an epidemiological disease caused by HIV, some models in population growth, included the Malthus Model, and an epidemic model refers to COVID-19. The book is ideally suited to graduate students in mathematics and related fields, professionals, researchers, or the public interested in interval type-2 fuzzy modeling. Largely self-contained, it can also be used as a supplementary text in specialized graduate courses.
The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction
by Justin GarsonFor some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human consciousness? The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction explores these questions and more, using the philosophy of biology to introduce and assess the nature of the mind. Drawing on the four key themes of evolutionary biology; molecular biology and genetics; neuroscience; and biomedicine and psychiatry Justin Garson addresses the following key topics: moral psychology, altruism and levels of selection evolutionary psychology and modularity genes, environment and the nature-nurture debate neuroscience, reductionism and the relation between biology and free will function, selection and mental representation psychiatric classification and the maladapted mind. Extensive use of examples and case studies is made throughout the book, and additional features such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary make this an indispensable introduction to those teaching philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology. It will also be an excellent resource for those in related fields such as biology.
The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction
by Justin GarsonFor some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human consciousness? The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction explores these questions and more, using the philosophy of biology to introduce and assess the nature of the mind. Drawing on the four key themes of evolutionary biology; molecular biology and genetics; neuroscience; and biomedicine and psychiatry Justin Garson addresses the following key topics: moral psychology, altruism and levels of selection evolutionary psychology and modularity genes, environment and the nature-nurture debate neuroscience, reductionism and the relation between biology and free will function, selection and mental representation psychiatric classification and the maladapted mind. Extensive use of examples and case studies is made throughout the book, and additional features such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary make this an indispensable introduction to those teaching philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology. It will also be an excellent resource for those in related fields such as biology.
The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction
by Justin GarsonFor some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: Is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human thought? Revised and updated to take account of new developments in the field, The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction explores these questions and more, using the philosophy of biology to introduce and assess the nature of the mind. Justin Garson addresses the following key topics: moral psychology, altruism, and levels of selection; evolutionary psychology and the adaptationism debate; genes, environment, and the nature–nurture debate; natural selection and mental representation; psychiatric classification and the maladapted mind. This second edition includes three new chapters on race, sex, and human nature as well as new sections on group and kin selection, psychological altruism, and cultural evolution. Including chapter summaries, annotated further readings, a glossary of terms, and examples and case studies throughout, this is an indispensable introduction for those teaching philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of biology. It will also be an excellent resource for those in related fields such as biology.
The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction
by Justin GarsonFor some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: Is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human thought? Revised and updated to take account of new developments in the field, The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction explores these questions and more, using the philosophy of biology to introduce and assess the nature of the mind. Justin Garson addresses the following key topics: moral psychology, altruism, and levels of selection; evolutionary psychology and the adaptationism debate; genes, environment, and the nature–nurture debate; natural selection and mental representation; psychiatric classification and the maladapted mind. This second edition includes three new chapters on race, sex, and human nature as well as new sections on group and kin selection, psychological altruism, and cultural evolution. Including chapter summaries, annotated further readings, a glossary of terms, and examples and case studies throughout, this is an indispensable introduction for those teaching philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of biology. It will also be an excellent resource for those in related fields such as biology.
Biological Individuality: Integrating Scientific, Philosophical, and Historical Perspectives
by Scott Lidgard Lynn NyhartIndividuals are things that everybody knows—or thinks they do. Yet even scholars who practice or analyze the biological sciences often cannot agree on what an individual is and why. One reason for this disagreement is that the many important biological individuality concepts serve very different purposes—defining, classifying, or explaining living structure, function, interaction, persistence, or evolution. Indeed, as the contributors to Biological Individuality reveal, nature is too messy for simple definitions of this concept, organisms too quirky in the diverse ways they reproduce, function, and interact, and human ideas about individuality too fraught with philosophical and historical meaning. Bringing together biologists, historians, and philosophers, this book provides a multifaceted exploration of biological individuality that identifies leading and less familiar perceptions of individuality both past and present, what they are good for, and in what contexts. Biological practice and theory recognize individuals at myriad levels of organization, from genes to organisms to symbiotic systems. We depend on these notions of individuality to address theoretical questions about multilevel natural selection and Darwinian fitness; to illuminate empirical questions about development, function, and ecology; to ground philosophical questions about the nature of organisms and causation; and to probe historical and cultural circumstances that resonate with parallel questions about the nature of society. Charting an interdisciplinary research agenda that broadens the frameworks in which biological individuality is discussed, this book makes clear that in the realm of the individual, there is not and should not be a direct path from biological paradigms based on model organisms through to philosophical generalization and historical reification.
Biological Individuality: Integrating Scientific, Philosophical, and Historical Perspectives
by Scott Lidgard Lynn K. NyhartIndividuals are things that everybody knows—or thinks they do. Yet even scholars who practice or analyze the biological sciences often cannot agree on what an individual is and why. One reason for this disagreement is that the many important biological individuality concepts serve very different purposes—defining, classifying, or explaining living structure, function, interaction, persistence, or evolution. Indeed, as the contributors to Biological Individuality reveal, nature is too messy for simple definitions of this concept, organisms too quirky in the diverse ways they reproduce, function, and interact, and human ideas about individuality too fraught with philosophical and historical meaning. Bringing together biologists, historians, and philosophers, this book provides a multifaceted exploration of biological individuality that identifies leading and less familiar perceptions of individuality both past and present, what they are good for, and in what contexts. Biological practice and theory recognize individuals at myriad levels of organization, from genes to organisms to symbiotic systems. We depend on these notions of individuality to address theoretical questions about multilevel natural selection and Darwinian fitness; to illuminate empirical questions about development, function, and ecology; to ground philosophical questions about the nature of organisms and causation; and to probe historical and cultural circumstances that resonate with parallel questions about the nature of society. Charting an interdisciplinary research agenda that broadens the frameworks in which biological individuality is discussed, this book makes clear that in the realm of the individual, there is not and should not be a direct path from biological paradigms based on model organisms through to philosophical generalization and historical reification.
Biological Individuality: Integrating Scientific, Philosophical, and Historical Perspectives
by Scott Lidgard and Lynn K. Nyhart Lynn K. NyhartIndividuals are things that everybody knows—or thinks they do. Yet even scholars who practice or analyze the biological sciences often cannot agree on what an individual is and why. One reason for this disagreement is that the many important biological individuality concepts serve very different purposes—defining, classifying, or explaining living structure, function, interaction, persistence, or evolution. Indeed, as the contributors to Biological Individuality reveal, nature is too messy for simple definitions of this concept, organisms too quirky in the diverse ways they reproduce, function, and interact, and human ideas about individuality too fraught with philosophical and historical meaning. Bringing together biologists, historians, and philosophers, this book provides a multifaceted exploration of biological individuality that identifies leading and less familiar perceptions of individuality both past and present, what they are good for, and in what contexts. Biological practice and theory recognize individuals at myriad levels of organization, from genes to organisms to symbiotic systems. We depend on these notions of individuality to address theoretical questions about multilevel natural selection and Darwinian fitness; to illuminate empirical questions about development, function, and ecology; to ground philosophical questions about the nature of organisms and causation; and to probe historical and cultural circumstances that resonate with parallel questions about the nature of society. Charting an interdisciplinary research agenda that broadens the frameworks in which biological individuality is discussed, this book makes clear that in the realm of the individual, there is not and should not be a direct path from biological paradigms based on model organisms through to philosophical generalization and historical reification.
Biological Individuality: Integrating Scientific, Philosophical, and Historical Perspectives
by Scott Lidgard and Lynn K. Nyhart Lynn K. NyhartIndividuals are things that everybody knows—or thinks they do. Yet even scholars who practice or analyze the biological sciences often cannot agree on what an individual is and why. One reason for this disagreement is that the many important biological individuality concepts serve very different purposes—defining, classifying, or explaining living structure, function, interaction, persistence, or evolution. Indeed, as the contributors to Biological Individuality reveal, nature is too messy for simple definitions of this concept, organisms too quirky in the diverse ways they reproduce, function, and interact, and human ideas about individuality too fraught with philosophical and historical meaning. Bringing together biologists, historians, and philosophers, this book provides a multifaceted exploration of biological individuality that identifies leading and less familiar perceptions of individuality both past and present, what they are good for, and in what contexts. Biological practice and theory recognize individuals at myriad levels of organization, from genes to organisms to symbiotic systems. We depend on these notions of individuality to address theoretical questions about multilevel natural selection and Darwinian fitness; to illuminate empirical questions about development, function, and ecology; to ground philosophical questions about the nature of organisms and causation; and to probe historical and cultural circumstances that resonate with parallel questions about the nature of society. Charting an interdisciplinary research agenda that broadens the frameworks in which biological individuality is discussed, this book makes clear that in the realm of the individual, there is not and should not be a direct path from biological paradigms based on model organisms through to philosophical generalization and historical reification.
Biological Individuality: Integrating Scientific, Philosophical, and Historical Perspectives
by Scott Lidgard and Lynn K. Nyhart Lynn K. NyhartIndividuals are things that everybody knows—or thinks they do. Yet even scholars who practice or analyze the biological sciences often cannot agree on what an individual is and why. One reason for this disagreement is that the many important biological individuality concepts serve very different purposes—defining, classifying, or explaining living structure, function, interaction, persistence, or evolution. Indeed, as the contributors to Biological Individuality reveal, nature is too messy for simple definitions of this concept, organisms too quirky in the diverse ways they reproduce, function, and interact, and human ideas about individuality too fraught with philosophical and historical meaning. Bringing together biologists, historians, and philosophers, this book provides a multifaceted exploration of biological individuality that identifies leading and less familiar perceptions of individuality both past and present, what they are good for, and in what contexts. Biological practice and theory recognize individuals at myriad levels of organization, from genes to organisms to symbiotic systems. We depend on these notions of individuality to address theoretical questions about multilevel natural selection and Darwinian fitness; to illuminate empirical questions about development, function, and ecology; to ground philosophical questions about the nature of organisms and causation; and to probe historical and cultural circumstances that resonate with parallel questions about the nature of society. Charting an interdisciplinary research agenda that broadens the frameworks in which biological individuality is discussed, this book makes clear that in the realm of the individual, there is not and should not be a direct path from biological paradigms based on model organisms through to philosophical generalization and historical reification.
Biological Individuality: Integrating Scientific, Philosophical, and Historical Perspectives
Individuals are things that everybody knows—or thinks they do. Yet even scholars who practice or analyze the biological sciences often cannot agree on what an individual is and why. One reason for this disagreement is that the many important biological individuality concepts serve very different purposes—defining, classifying, or explaining living structure, function, interaction, persistence, or evolution. Indeed, as the contributors to Biological Individuality reveal, nature is too messy for simple definitions of this concept, organisms too quirky in the diverse ways they reproduce, function, and interact, and human ideas about individuality too fraught with philosophical and historical meaning. Bringing together biologists, historians, and philosophers, this book provides a multifaceted exploration of biological individuality that identifies leading and less familiar perceptions of individuality both past and present, what they are good for, and in what contexts. Biological practice and theory recognize individuals at myriad levels of organization, from genes to organisms to symbiotic systems. We depend on these notions of individuality to address theoretical questions about multilevel natural selection and Darwinian fitness; to illuminate empirical questions about development, function, and ecology; to ground philosophical questions about the nature of organisms and causation; and to probe historical and cultural circumstances that resonate with parallel questions about the nature of society. Charting an interdisciplinary research agenda that broadens the frameworks in which biological individuality is discussed, this book makes clear that in the realm of the individual, there is not and should not be a direct path from biological paradigms based on model organisms through to philosophical generalization and historical reification.