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Agency in Mental Disorder: Philosophical Dimensions
by Matt King Joshua MayMental illness is an issue of great practical importance. Yet, despite sustained inquiry from scientists and philosophers alike, relatively little attention has been paid to the significance of mental disorder to agency and responsibility. While there is some work that touches on the topic, and a few extended treatments of particular disorders, these only scratch the surface. Agency in Mental Disorder seeks to provide a starting point for deeper and broader philosophical analyses. The 8 new essays in this book address various questions about the relationship between agency and mental disorder. What is the nature of that relationship? In what ways do mental disorders affect capacities for control? How should we understand the mitigations of blame that mental disorders seem to provide, and can we generalize from specific disorders to any interesting claims about disorders as a class? And what makes for a mental disorder in the first place?
The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality
by Bernard ReginsterOn the Genealogy of Morality is Nietzsche's most influential book but it continues to puzzle, not least in its central claim: the invention of Christian morality is an act of revenge, and it is as such that it should arouse critical suspicion. In The Will to Nothingness, Bernard Reginster makes a fresh attempt at understanding this claim and its significance, inspired by Nietzsche's claim that moralities are 'signs' or 'symptoms' of the affective states of moral agents. The relation between morality and affects is envisioned as functional, rather than expressive: the genealogy of Christian morality aims to reveal how it is well suited to serve certain emotional needs. One particular emotional need, manifested in the affect of ressentiment, plays a prominent role in the analysis of Christian morality. This is the need to have the world reflect one's will, which is rooted in a special drive toward power, or toward bending the world to one's will. Revenge is plausibly understood as aiming to bolster or restore power, and the invention of new values is a particular way to do so: by altering the agent's will (her values), it alters what counts as power for her. By revealing how it is well suited to play such a functional role in the emotional economy of moral agents, the genealogical inquiries arouse critical suspicion toward Christian morality. The use of this moral outlook as an instrument of revenge is problematic not because it is immoral, but because it is functionally self-undermining.
The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality
by Bernard ReginsterOn the Genealogy of Morality is Nietzsche's most influential book but it continues to puzzle, not least in its central claim: the invention of Christian morality is an act of revenge, and it is as such that it should arouse critical suspicion. In The Will to Nothingness, Bernard Reginster makes a fresh attempt at understanding this claim and its significance, inspired by Nietzsche's claim that moralities are 'signs' or 'symptoms' of the affective states of moral agents. The relation between morality and affects is envisioned as functional, rather than expressive: the genealogy of Christian morality aims to reveal how it is well suited to serve certain emotional needs. One particular emotional need, manifested in the affect of ressentiment, plays a prominent role in the analysis of Christian morality. This is the need to have the world reflect one's will, which is rooted in a special drive toward power, or toward bending the world to one's will. Revenge is plausibly understood as aiming to bolster or restore power, and the invention of new values is a particular way to do so: by altering the agent's will (her values), it alters what counts as power for her. By revealing how it is well suited to play such a functional role in the emotional economy of moral agents, the genealogical inquiries arouse critical suspicion toward Christian morality. The use of this moral outlook as an instrument of revenge is problematic not because it is immoral, but because it is functionally self-undermining.
Oxford's Savilian Professors of Geometry: The First 400 Years
The Savilian Professorships in Geometry and Astronomy at Oxford University were founded in 1619 by Sir Henry Savile, distinguished scholar and Warden of Merton College. The Geometry chair, in particular, is the earliest University-based mathematics professorship in England, predating the first Cambridge equivalent by about sixty years. To celebrate the 400th anniversary of the founding of the geometry chair, a meeting was held at the Bodleian Library in Oxford, and the talks presented at this meeting have formed the basis for this fully edited and lavishly illustrated book, which outlines the first 400 years of Oxford's Savilian Professors of Geometry. Starting with Henry Briggs, the co-inventor of logarithms, this volume proceeds via such figures as John Wallis, a founder member of the Royal Society, and Edmond Halley, via the 19th-century figures of Stephen Rigaud, Baden Powell, Henry Smith, and James Joseph Sylvester, to the 20th century and the present day. Oxford's Savilian Professors of Geometry: The First 400 Years assumes no mathematical background, and should therefore appeal to the interested general reader with an interest in mathematics and the sciences. It should also be of interest to anyone interested in the history of mathematics or of the development of Oxford and its namesake university. To all of these audiences it offers portraits of mathematicians at work and an accessible exposition of historical mathematics in the context of its times.
Rational Rules: Towards a Theory of Moral Learning
by Shaun NicholsMoral systems, like normative systems more broadly, involve complex mental representations. Rational Rules proposes that moral learning can be understood in terms of general-purpose rational learning procedures. Nichols argues that statistical learning can help answer a wide range of questions about moral thought: Why do people think that rules apply to actions rather than consequences? Why do people expect new rules to be focused on actions rather than consequences? How do people come to believe a principle of liberty, according to which whatever is not expressly prohibited is permitted? How do people decide that some normative claims hold universally while others hold only relative to some group? The resulting account has both empiricist and rationalist features: since the learning procedures are domain-general, the result is an empiricist theory of a key part of moral development, and since the learning procedures are forms of rational inference, the account entails that crucial parts of our moral system enjoy rational credentials. Moral rules can also be rational in the sense that they can be effective for achieving our ends, given our ecological settings. Rational Rules argues that at least some central components of our moral systems are indeed ecologically rational: they are good at helping us attain common goals. Nichols argues that the account might be extended to capture moral motivation as a special case of a much more general phenomenon of normative motivation. On this view, a basic form of rule representation brings motivation along automatically, and so part of the explanation for why we follow moral rules is that we are built to follow rules quite generally.
Rational Rules: Towards a Theory of Moral Learning
by Shaun NicholsMoral systems, like normative systems more broadly, involve complex mental representations. Rational Rules proposes that moral learning can be understood in terms of general-purpose rational learning procedures. Nichols argues that statistical learning can help answer a wide range of questions about moral thought: Why do people think that rules apply to actions rather than consequences? Why do people expect new rules to be focused on actions rather than consequences? How do people come to believe a principle of liberty, according to which whatever is not expressly prohibited is permitted? How do people decide that some normative claims hold universally while others hold only relative to some group? The resulting account has both empiricist and rationalist features: since the learning procedures are domain-general, the result is an empiricist theory of a key part of moral development, and since the learning procedures are forms of rational inference, the account entails that crucial parts of our moral system enjoy rational credentials. Moral rules can also be rational in the sense that they can be effective for achieving our ends, given our ecological settings. Rational Rules argues that at least some central components of our moral systems are indeed ecologically rational: they are good at helping us attain common goals. Nichols argues that the account might be extended to capture moral motivation as a special case of a much more general phenomenon of normative motivation. On this view, a basic form of rule representation brings motivation along automatically, and so part of the explanation for why we follow moral rules is that we are built to follow rules quite generally.
Parenthetical Meaning (Oxford Studies in Semantics and Pragmatics #14)
by Todor KoevThis book investigates the semantics and pragmatics of a representative sample of parenthetical constructions. Todor Koev argues that these constructions fall into two major classes: pure and impure. Pure parentheticals comment on some part of the descriptive content of the root sentence but are otherwise relatively independent of it. Impure parentheticals modify components of the illocutionary force and affect the felicity or the truth of the root sentence. The book studies parentheticals from three theoretical viewpoints: illocutionary effects, scopal properties, and discourse status. It establishes and explicates the notion of parenthetical meaning in a formally precise and predictive dynamic-semantic model. As a result, parentheticality is brought to bear on linguistic phenomena such as entailment and presupposition, binding and anaphora, evidentiality and modality, illocutionary force, and polarity.
The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the 'Mind-Body Problem' (Oxford Aristotle Studies Series)
by David CharlesAristotle initiated the systematic investigation of perception, the emotions, memory, desire and action, developing his own account of these phenomena and their interconnection. The aim of this book is to gain a philosophical understanding of his views and to examine how far they withstand critical scrutiny. Aristotle's account, it is argued, constitutes a philosophically live alternative to conventional post-Cartesian thinking about psychological phenomena and their place in a material world. It offers a way to dissolve, rather than solve, the mind-body problem we have inherited.
Reconsidering Causal Powers: Historical and Conceptual Perspectives
Causal powers are returning to the forefront of realist philosophy of science. Once central features of philosophical thinking about the natures of substances and causes, they were banished during the early modern era and the Scientific Revolution. In this volume, distinguished scholars revisit the fortunes of causal powers as scientific explanatory principles within the theories of substance and cause across history. Each chapter focuses on the philosophical roles causal powers were thought to play at the time, and the reasons offered in support, or against, their coherence and ability to perform these roles. By placing rigorous philosophical analyses of thinking about causal powers within their historical contexts, features of their natures which might remain hidden to contemporary practitioners can be more readily identified and more carefully analyzed. The thoughts of such prominent philosophers as Aristotle, Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan are explored, then on through Suarez, Descartes, and Malebranche, to Locke and Hume, and ultimately to contemporary figures like the logical positivists Goodman and Lewis.
Democratic Speech in Divided Times
by Maxime LepoutreIn an ideal democracy, people from all walks of life would come together to talk meaningfully and respectfully about politics. But we do not live in an ideal democracy. In contemporary democracies, which are marked by deep social divisions, different groups for the most part avoid talking to each other. And when they do talk to each other, their speech often seems to be little more than a vehicle for rage, hatred, and deception. Democratic Speech in Divided Times argues that we should nevertheless not give up on the ideal of democratic public speech. Drawing on the resources of political theory, epistemology, and philosophy of language, this book develops a sustained account of the norms that should govern public discourse in deeply divided circumstances. Should we try to find common ground when we talk to our political opponents, even though they seem unreasonable? Should we refrain from expressing anger, if we want to get things done? How can we use our speech to fight hate speech and disinformation? And is it even possible to speak to 'the other side,' in settings where different groups dislike one another, live apart from one another, and don't know much about one another? By tackling these questions, Lepoutre demonstrates that, when governed by the right set of norms, public speech can be a powerful force for good even amidst profound social divisions.
Democratic Speech in Divided Times
by Maxime LepoutreIn an ideal democracy, people from all walks of life would come together to talk meaningfully and respectfully about politics. But we do not live in an ideal democracy. In contemporary democracies, which are marked by deep social divisions, different groups for the most part avoid talking to each other. And when they do talk to each other, their speech often seems to be little more than a vehicle for rage, hatred, and deception. Democratic Speech in Divided Times argues that we should nevertheless not give up on the ideal of democratic public speech. Drawing on the resources of political theory, epistemology, and philosophy of language, this book develops a sustained account of the norms that should govern public discourse in deeply divided circumstances. Should we try to find common ground when we talk to our political opponents, even though they seem unreasonable? Should we refrain from expressing anger, if we want to get things done? How can we use our speech to fight hate speech and disinformation? And is it even possible to speak to 'the other side,' in settings where different groups dislike one another, live apart from one another, and don't know much about one another? By tackling these questions, Lepoutre demonstrates that, when governed by the right set of norms, public speech can be a powerful force for good even amidst profound social divisions.
Experience and Possibility
by Joseph MendolaExperience and Possibility concerns the modal ontology of experience. It investigates the detailed metaphysics of the colors, shapes, and other concrete properties present in our experience of ordinary concrete objects, and also of their spatial and temporal relations. It examines their experienced particularity, and the nature of their locations and material bits. This detailed concern with specific cases reveals many inadequacies of traditional ontology. But the central novelty of the book is an intense focus on the modal aspects of such experienced entities, and what it reveals about modality in general. The reality of such things would involve in surprising ways not merely what would hence be actual but also what would be merely possible. This supports a general conception of modality, of the possible and the necessary, according to which the actual and the possible are locally entwined and involve different types of being. The particulars, properties, and relations we experience involve distinctive forms of modal structure, characteristic of specific sorts of universals and irreducible particularities. When this experience is not veridical, when for instance the color we experience is somewhat misleading about reality, it is a puzzle how we have such experience nonetheless. Exploration of these forms of modal structure is groundwork for a new account of how our neurophysiology explains such misleading experience, how our physical structure delivers such qualia. This is sketched for the case of experienced color. Its core idea is that the apparent modal structure of things we experience is sometimes due to the actual modal structure of the neurophysiology that constitutes that experience.
Experience and Possibility
by Joseph MendolaExperience and Possibility concerns the modal ontology of experience. It investigates the detailed metaphysics of the colors, shapes, and other concrete properties present in our experience of ordinary concrete objects, and also of their spatial and temporal relations. It examines their experienced particularity, and the nature of their locations and material bits. This detailed concern with specific cases reveals many inadequacies of traditional ontology. But the central novelty of the book is an intense focus on the modal aspects of such experienced entities, and what it reveals about modality in general. The reality of such things would involve in surprising ways not merely what would hence be actual but also what would be merely possible. This supports a general conception of modality, of the possible and the necessary, according to which the actual and the possible are locally entwined and involve different types of being. The particulars, properties, and relations we experience involve distinctive forms of modal structure, characteristic of specific sorts of universals and irreducible particularities. When this experience is not veridical, when for instance the color we experience is somewhat misleading about reality, it is a puzzle how we have such experience nonetheless. Exploration of these forms of modal structure is groundwork for a new account of how our neurophysiology explains such misleading experience, how our physical structure delivers such qualia. This is sketched for the case of experienced color. Its core idea is that the apparent modal structure of things we experience is sometimes due to the actual modal structure of the neurophysiology that constitutes that experience.
Reconsidering Causal Powers: Historical and Conceptual Perspectives
by Henrik Lagerlund Benjamin Hill Stathis PsillosCausal powers are returning to the forefront of realist philosophy of science. Once central features of philosophical thinking about the natures of substances and causes, they were banished during the early modern era and the Scientific Revolution. In this volume, distinguished scholars revisit the fortunes of causal powers as scientific explanatory principles within the theories of substance and cause across history. Each chapter focuses on the philosophical roles causal powers were thought to play at the time, and the reasons offered in support, or against, their coherence and ability to perform these roles. By placing rigorous philosophical analyses of thinking about causal powers within their historical contexts, features of their natures which might remain hidden to contemporary practitioners can be more readily identified and more carefully analyzed. The thoughts of such prominent philosophers as Aristotle, Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan are explored, then on through Suarez, Descartes, and Malebranche, to Locke and Hume, and ultimately to contemporary figures like the logical positivists Goodman and Lewis.
The Ethics of Privacy and Surveillance (Oxford Philosophical Monographs)
by Carissa VélizPrivacy matters because it shields us from possible abuses of power. Human beings need privacy just as much as they need community. Our need for socialization brings with it risks and burdens which in turn give rise to the need for spaces and time away from others. To impose surveillance upon someone is an act of domination. The foundations of democracy quiver under surveillance. Given how important privacy is for individual and collective wellbeing, it is striking that it has not enjoyed a more central place in philosophy. The philosophical literature on privacy and surveillance is still very limited compared to that on justice, autonomy, or equality-and yet the former plays a role in protecting all three values. Perhaps philosophers haven't attended much to privacy because for most of the past two centuries there have been strong enough privacy norms in place and not enough invasive technologies. Privacy worked for most people most of the time, which made thinking about it unnecessary. It's when things stop working that the philosopher's attention is most easily caught-the owl of Minerva spreading its wings only with impending dusk. With the spread of machine learning, a kind of AI that often uses vast amounts of personal data, and a whole industry dedicated to the trade of personal data becoming one of the most popular business models of the 21st century, it's time for philosophy to look more closely at privacy. This book is intended to contribute to a better understanding of privacy from a philosophical point of view-what it is, what is at stake in its loss, and how it relates to other rights and values. The five parts that compose this book respond to five basic questions about privacy: Where does privacy come from? What is privacy? Why does privacy matter? What should we do about privacy? Where are we now?
The Ethics of Privacy and Surveillance (Oxford Philosophical Monographs)
by Carissa VélizPrivacy matters because it shields us from possible abuses of power. Human beings need privacy just as much as they need community. Our need for socialization brings with it risks and burdens which in turn give rise to the need for spaces and time away from others. To impose surveillance upon someone is an act of domination. The foundations of democracy quiver under surveillance. Given how important privacy is for individual and collective wellbeing, it is striking that it has not enjoyed a more central place in philosophy. The philosophical literature on privacy and surveillance is still very limited compared to that on justice, autonomy, or equality-and yet the former plays a role in protecting all three values. Perhaps philosophers haven't attended much to privacy because for most of the past two centuries there have been strong enough privacy norms in place and not enough invasive technologies. Privacy worked for most people most of the time, which made thinking about it unnecessary. It's when things stop working that the philosopher's attention is most easily caught-the owl of Minerva spreading its wings only with impending dusk. With the spread of machine learning, a kind of AI that often uses vast amounts of personal data, and a whole industry dedicated to the trade of personal data becoming one of the most popular business models of the 21st century, it's time for philosophy to look more closely at privacy. This book is intended to contribute to a better understanding of privacy from a philosophical point of view-what it is, what is at stake in its loss, and how it relates to other rights and values. The five parts that compose this book respond to five basic questions about privacy: Where does privacy come from? What is privacy? Why does privacy matter? What should we do about privacy? Where are we now?
Englishness: The Political Force Transforming Britain
by Ailsa Henderson Richard Wyn JonesUntil the Brexit referendum, there was widespread doubt as to whether English nationalism existed at all, at least beyond a small fringe. Since then, it has come to be regarded an obvious explanation for the vote to Leave the European Union. Subsequent opinion polls have raised doubts about the extent of continuing English commitment to the Union of the United Kingdom itself. Yet even as Englishness is apparently reshaping Britain's place in world and perhaps, ultimately, the state itself, it remains poorly understood. In this book Ailsa Henderson and Richard Wyn Jones draw on data from the Future of England Survey, a specially commissioned public attitudes survey programme exploring the political implications of English identity, to make new and original arguments about the nature of English nationalism. They demonstrate that English nationalism is emphatically not a rejection of Britain and Britishness. Rather, English nationalism combines a sense of grievance about England's place within the United Kingdom with a fierce commitment to a particular vision of Britain's past, present, and future. Understanding its Janus-faced nature - both England and Britain - is key not only to understanding English nationalism, but also to understanding the ways in which it is transforming British politics.
Perception: First Form of Mind
by Tyler BurgeIn Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of mental representational: perception. Focusing on the functions and capacities of perceptual states, Burge accounts for their representational content and structure, and develops a formal semantics for them. The discussion explains the role of iconic format in the structure. It also situates the accounts of content, structure, and semantics within scientific explanations of perceptual-state formation, emphasizing formation of perceptual categorization. In the book's second half, Burge discusses what a perceptual system is. Exploration of relations between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-helps distinguish perceiving, with its associated capacities, from thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing mainly on vision science, not introspection, Perception: First Form of Mind is a rigorous, agenda-setting work in philosophy of perception and philosophy of science.
Perception: First Form of Mind
by Tyler BurgeIn Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of mental representational: perception. Focusing on the functions and capacities of perceptual states, Burge accounts for their representational content and structure, and develops a formal semantics for them. The discussion explains the role of iconic format in the structure. It also situates the accounts of content, structure, and semantics within scientific explanations of perceptual-state formation, emphasizing formation of perceptual categorization. In the book's second half, Burge discusses what a perceptual system is. Exploration of relations between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-helps distinguish perceiving, with its associated capacities, from thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing mainly on vision science, not introspection, Perception: First Form of Mind is a rigorous, agenda-setting work in philosophy of perception and philosophy of science.
Being Social: The Philosophy of Social Human Rights
Human rights capture what people need to live minimally decent lives. Recognised dimensions of this minimum include physical security, due process, political participation, and freedom of movement, speech, and belief, as well as - more controversially for some - subsistence, shelter, health, education, culture, and community. Far less attention has been paid to the interpersonal, social dimensions of a minimally decent life, including our basic needs for decent human contact and acknowledgement, for interaction and adequate social inclusion, and for relationship, intimacy, and shared ways of living, as well as our competing interests in solitude and associative freedom. This pioneering collection of original essays aims to remedy the neglect of social needs and rights in human rights theory and practice by exploring the social dimensions of the human-rights minimum. The essays subject enumerated social human rights and proposed social human rights to philosophical scrutiny, and probe the conceptual, normative, and practical implications of taking social human rights seriously. The contributors to this volume demonstrate powerfully how important this undertaking is, despite the thorny theoretical and practical challenges that social rights present. Being Social is the first in-depth and polyphonic philosophical treatment of social rights qua human rights in the English language. It explains how social rights are rights to participate and not only to being in society, but also, even more importantly, it uncovers the social and interactional dimension of all human rights. A must-read for international human rights lawyers concerned about the critique of human rights' individualism.' - Professor Samantha Besson, International Law of Institutions Chair, Collège de France, Paris & Professor of Public International Law and European Law, University of Fribourg, Switzerland 'Every human being has deep needs for sociality: for contact, connection, intimacy, inclusion, recognition, and community. In this pioneering volume, leading experts explore how social human rights can help fulfil these needs in our homes, workplaces, cities, nations, and virtual worlds. Since a human life is a life with others, human rights must include social rights too.' - Leif Wenar, Olive H. Palmer Professor in Humanities, Stanford University
Being Social: The Philosophy of Social Human Rights
by Kimberley Brownlee David Jenkins Adam NealHuman rights capture what people need to live minimally decent lives. Recognised dimensions of this minimum include physical security, due process, political participation, and freedom of movement, speech, and belief, as well as - more controversially for some - subsistence, shelter, health, education, culture, and community. Far less attention has been paid to the interpersonal, social dimensions of a minimally decent life, including our basic needs for decent human contact and acknowledgement, for interaction and adequate social inclusion, and for relationship, intimacy, and shared ways of living, as well as our competing interests in solitude and associative freedom. This pioneering collection of original essays aims to remedy the neglect of social needs and rights in human rights theory and practice by exploring the social dimensions of the human-rights minimum. The essays subject enumerated social human rights and proposed social human rights to philosophical scrutiny, and probe the conceptual, normative, and practical implications of taking social human rights seriously. The contributors to this volume demonstrate powerfully how important this undertaking is, despite the thorny theoretical and practical challenges that social rights present. Being Social is the first in-depth and polyphonic philosophical treatment of social rights qua human rights in the English language. It explains how social rights are rights to participate and not only to being in society, but also, even more importantly, it uncovers the social and interactional dimension of all human rights. A must-read for international human rights lawyers concerned about the critique of human rights' individualism.' - Professor Samantha Besson, International Law of Institutions Chair, Collège de France, Paris & Professor of Public International Law and European Law, University of Fribourg, Switzerland 'Every human being has deep needs for sociality: for contact, connection, intimacy, inclusion, recognition, and community. In this pioneering volume, leading experts explore how social human rights can help fulfil these needs in our homes, workplaces, cities, nations, and virtual worlds. Since a human life is a life with others, human rights must include social rights too.' - Leif Wenar, Olive H. Palmer Professor in Humanities, Stanford University
How Nature Matters: Culture, Identity, and Environmental Value
by Simon P. JamesHOW NATURE MATTERS presents an original theory of nature's value based on part—whole relations. James argues that when natural things have cultural value, they do not always have it as means to valuable ends. In many cases, they have value as parts of valuable wholes — as parts of traditions, for instance, or cultural identities. James develops his theory by investigating twelve real-world cases, ranging from the veneration of sacred trees to the hunting of dugongs. He also analyses some key policy-related debates and explores various fundamental issues in environmental philosophy, including the question of whether anything on earth qualifies as natural. This accessible, engagingly written book will be essential reading for all those who wish to understand the moral and metaphysical dimensions of environmental issues.
How Nature Matters: Culture, Identity, and Environmental Value
by Simon P. JamesHOW NATURE MATTERS presents an original theory of nature's value based on part—whole relations. James argues that when natural things have cultural value, they do not always have it as means to valuable ends. In many cases, they have value as parts of valuable wholes — as parts of traditions, for instance, or cultural identities. James develops his theory by investigating twelve real-world cases, ranging from the veneration of sacred trees to the hunting of dugongs. He also analyses some key policy-related debates and explores various fundamental issues in environmental philosophy, including the question of whether anything on earth qualifies as natural. This accessible, engagingly written book will be essential reading for all those who wish to understand the moral and metaphysical dimensions of environmental issues.
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12 (Oxford Studies in Metaphysics #12)
Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philsophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12 (Oxford Studies in Metaphysics #12)
by Dean W. Zimmerman Karen BennettMuch of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philsophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.