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Philology of the Flesh
by John T. HamiltonAs the Christian doctrine of Incarnation asserts, “the Word became Flesh.” Yet, while this metaphor is grounded in Christian tradition, its varied functions far exceed any purely theological import. It speaks to the nature of God just as much as to the nature of language. In Philology of the Flesh, John T. Hamilton explores writing and reading practices that engage this notion in a range of poetic enterprises and theoretical reflections. By pressing the notion of philology as “love” (philia) for the “word” (logos), Hamilton’s readings investigate the breadth, depth, and limits of verbal styles that are irreducible to mere information. While a philologist of the body might understand words as corporeal vessels of core meaning, the philologist of the flesh, by focusing on the carnal qualities of language, resists taking words as mere containers. By examining a series of intellectual episodes—from the fifteenth-century Humanism of Lorenzo Valla to the poetry of Emily Dickinson, from Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann to Friedrich Nietzsche, Franz Kafka, and Paul Celan—Philology of the Flesh considers the far-reaching ramifications of the incarnational metaphor, insisting on the inseparability of form and content, an insistence that allows us to rethink our relation to the concrete languages in which we think and live.
Philology of the Flesh
by John T. HamiltonAs the Christian doctrine of Incarnation asserts, “the Word became Flesh.” Yet, while this metaphor is grounded in Christian tradition, its varied functions far exceed any purely theological import. It speaks to the nature of God just as much as to the nature of language. In Philology of the Flesh, John T. Hamilton explores writing and reading practices that engage this notion in a range of poetic enterprises and theoretical reflections. By pressing the notion of philology as “love” (philia) for the “word” (logos), Hamilton’s readings investigate the breadth, depth, and limits of verbal styles that are irreducible to mere information. While a philologist of the body might understand words as corporeal vessels of core meaning, the philologist of the flesh, by focusing on the carnal qualities of language, resists taking words as mere containers. By examining a series of intellectual episodes—from the fifteenth-century Humanism of Lorenzo Valla to the poetry of Emily Dickinson, from Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann to Friedrich Nietzsche, Franz Kafka, and Paul Celan—Philology of the Flesh considers the far-reaching ramifications of the incarnational metaphor, insisting on the inseparability of form and content, an insistence that allows us to rethink our relation to the concrete languages in which we think and live.
Philology of the Flesh
by John T. HamiltonAs the Christian doctrine of Incarnation asserts, “the Word became Flesh.” Yet, while this metaphor is grounded in Christian tradition, its varied functions far exceed any purely theological import. It speaks to the nature of God just as much as to the nature of language. In Philology of the Flesh, John T. Hamilton explores writing and reading practices that engage this notion in a range of poetic enterprises and theoretical reflections. By pressing the notion of philology as “love” (philia) for the “word” (logos), Hamilton’s readings investigate the breadth, depth, and limits of verbal styles that are irreducible to mere information. While a philologist of the body might understand words as corporeal vessels of core meaning, the philologist of the flesh, by focusing on the carnal qualities of language, resists taking words as mere containers. By examining a series of intellectual episodes—from the fifteenth-century Humanism of Lorenzo Valla to the poetry of Emily Dickinson, from Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann to Friedrich Nietzsche, Franz Kafka, and Paul Celan—Philology of the Flesh considers the far-reaching ramifications of the incarnational metaphor, insisting on the inseparability of form and content, an insistence that allows us to rethink our relation to the concrete languages in which we think and live.
Philology of the Flesh
by John T. HamiltonAs the Christian doctrine of Incarnation asserts, “the Word became Flesh.” Yet, while this metaphor is grounded in Christian tradition, its varied functions far exceed any purely theological import. It speaks to the nature of God just as much as to the nature of language. In Philology of the Flesh, John T. Hamilton explores writing and reading practices that engage this notion in a range of poetic enterprises and theoretical reflections. By pressing the notion of philology as “love” (philia) for the “word” (logos), Hamilton’s readings investigate the breadth, depth, and limits of verbal styles that are irreducible to mere information. While a philologist of the body might understand words as corporeal vessels of core meaning, the philologist of the flesh, by focusing on the carnal qualities of language, resists taking words as mere containers. By examining a series of intellectual episodes—from the fifteenth-century Humanism of Lorenzo Valla to the poetry of Emily Dickinson, from Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann to Friedrich Nietzsche, Franz Kafka, and Paul Celan—Philology of the Flesh considers the far-reaching ramifications of the incarnational metaphor, insisting on the inseparability of form and content, an insistence that allows us to rethink our relation to the concrete languages in which we think and live.
Philomathes: Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan
by R. B. Palmer R. Hammerton-Kelly
Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 4.1-5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Keimpe Algra Johannes Van OphuijsenAristotle's account of place, in which he defined a thing's place as the inner surface of its nearest immobile container, was supported by the Latin Middle Ages, even 1600 years after his death, though it had not convinced many ancient Greek philosophers. The sixth century commentator Philoponus took a more common-sense view. For him, place was an immobile three-dimensional extension, whose essence did not preclude its being empty, even if for other reasons it had always to be filled with body. However, Philoponus reserved his own definition for an excursus, already translated in this series, The Corollary on Place. In the text translated here he wanted instead to explain Aristotle's view to elementary students. The recent conjecture that he wished to attract young fellow Christians away from the official pagan professor of philosophy in Alexandria has the merit of explaining why he expounds Aristotle here, rather than attacking him. But he still puts the students through their paces, for example when discussing Aristotle's claim that place cannot be a body, or two bodies would coincide.This volume contains an English translation of Philoponus' commentary, as well as a detailed introduction, extensive explanatory notes and a bibliography.
'Philoponus': On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1-8 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by W. CharltonIn On the Soul 3.1-8, Aristotle first discusses the functions common to all five senses, such as self-awareness, and then moves on to Imagination and Intellect. This commentary on Aristotle's text has traditionally been ascribed to Philoponus, but William Charlton argues here that it should be ascribed to a later commentator, Stephanus. (The quotation marks used around his name indicate this disputed authorship.) 'Philoponus' reports the postulation of a special faculty for self-awareness, intended to preserve the unity of the person. He disagrees with 'Simplicius', the author of another commentary on On the Soul (also available in this series), by insisting that Imagination can apprehend things as true or false, and he disagrees with Aristotle by saying that we are not always free to imagine them otherwise than as they are. On Aristotle's Active Intellect. 'Philoponus' surveys different interpretations, but ascribes to Plutarch of Athens, and rejects, the view adopted by the real Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle's On Intellect that we have innate intellectual knowledge from a previous existence. Instead he takes the view that the Active Intellect enables us to form concepts by abstraction through serving as a model of something already separate from matter. Our commentator further disagrees with the real Philoponus by denying the Idealistic view that Platonic forms are intellects. Charlton sees 'Philoponus' as the excellent teacher and expositor that Stephanus was said to be.
'Philoponus': Philoponus': On Aristotle On The Soul 3. 9-13 With Stephanus: On Aristotle On Interpretation (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by W. CharltonThe earlier part of the commentary by 'Philoponus' on Aristotle's On the Soul is translated by William Charlton in another volume in the series. This volume includes the latter part of the commentary along with a translation of Stephanus' commentary on Aristotle 's On Interpretation. It thus enables readers to assess for themselves Charlton's view that the commentary once ascribed to Philoponus should in fact be ascribed to Stephanus. The two treatises of Aristotle here commented on are very different from each other. In On Interpretation Aristotle studies the logic of opposed pairs of statements. It is in this context that Aristotle discusses the nature of language and the implications for determinism of opposed predictions about a future occurrence, such as a sea-battle. And Stephanus, like his predecessor Ammonius, brings in other deterministic arguments not considered by Aristotle ('The Reaper' and the argument from God's foreknowledge). In On the Soul 3.9-13, Aristotle introduces a theory of action and motivation and sums up the role of perception in animal life. Despite the differences in subject matter between the two texts, Charlton is able to make a good case for Stephanus' authorship of both commentaries. He also sees Stephanus as preserving what was valuable from Ammonius' earlier commentary On Interpretation, while bringing to bear the virtue of greater concision. At the same time, Stephanus reveals his Christian affiliations, in contrast to Ammonius, his pagan predecessor.
Philoponus: On Aristotle On The Intellect (de Anima 3. 4-8) (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by William CharltonIn his commentary on a portion of Aristotle's de Anima (On the Soul) known as de Intellectu (On the Intellect), Philoponus drew on both Christian and Neoplatonic traditions as he reinterpreted Aristotle's views on such key questions as the immortality of the soul, the role of images in thought, the character of sense perception and the presence within the soul of universals. Although it is one of the richest and most interesting of the ancient works on Aristotle, Philoponus' commentary has survived only in William of Moerbeke's thirteenth-century Latin translation from a partly indecipherable Greek manuscript. The present version, the first translation into English, is based upon William Charlton's penetrating scholarly analysis of Moerbeke's text.
Philoponus: On Aristotle On Coming to be 1.6-2.4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by C.J.F. WilliamThese chapters of Aristotle's treatise are about physical interactions. In his innovative commentary, Philoponus discusses Aristotle's idea that certain qualities of the elements are basic. In what way are they basic? he asks. To what extent can the other qualities be reduced to the basic ones? And if the other qualities depend on the basic ones, how is it that they can vary independently of each other when the basic qualities change? Philoponus develops the idea that the other qualities merely supervene on the basic ones, rather than resulting from them. Moreover, physical qualities admit of different ranges of variation, and so have different thresholds at which they appear or disappear. Philoponus also discusses Aristotle's idea that the elements and their basic qualities survive potentially when mixed together. He explains this by drawing a third sense of 'potential' out of Aristotle's texts to take the place of the two senses which Aristotle explicitly recognises. Philoponus adds further restrictions to Aristotle's principles of causation. Black can contaminate white, but the black in ebony does not have the right matter for affecting the white of milk. He asks why fluids can affect each other more easily than solids. In every case, Philoponus takes Aristotle's discussions further, and his ideas on the dependence of some qualities on others are very relevant to the continuing philosophical debate on the subject.
Philoponus: On Aristotle On Coming-to-Be and Perishing 1.1-5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by C.J.F. WilliamsThe first five chapters of Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione distinguish creation and destruction from mere qualitative change and from growth. They include a fascinating debate about the atomists' analysis of creation and destruction as due to the rearrangement of indivisible atoms. Aristotle's rival belief in the infinite divisibility of matter is explained and defended against the atomists' powerful attack on infinite divisibility. But what inspired Philoponus most in his commentary is the topic of organic growth. How does it take place without ingested matter getting into the same place as the growing body? And how is personal identity preserved, if our matter is always in flux, and our form depends on our matter? If we do not depend on the persistence of matter why are we not immortal? Analogous problems of identity arise also for inanimate beings. Philoponus draws out a brief remark of Aristotle's to show that cause need not be like effect. For example, what makes something hard may be cold, not hard. This goes against a persistent philosophical prejudice, but Philoponus makes it plausible that Aristotle recognized this truth. These topics of identity over time and the principles of causation are still matters of intense discussion.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 3 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Mark EdwardsBook 3 of Aristotle's Physics primarily concerns two important concepts for his theory of nature: change and infinity. Change is important because, in Book 2, he has defined nature - the subject-matter of the Physics - as an internal source of change. Much of his discussion is dedicated to showing that the change occurs in the patient which undergoes it, not in the agent which causes it. Thus Book 3 is an important step in clearing the way for Book 8's claims for a divine mover who causes change but in whom no change occurs. The second half of Book 3 introduces Aristotle's doctrine of infinity as something which is always potential, never actual, never traversed and never multiplied. Here, as elsewhere, Philoponus the Christian turns Aristotle's own infinity arguments against the pagan Neoplatonist belief in a beginningless universe. Such a universe, Philoponus replies, would involve actual infinity of past years already traversed, and a multiple number of past days. The commentary also contains intimations of the doctrine of impetus - which has been regarded, in its medieval context, as a scientific revolution - as well as striking examples of Philoponus' use of thought experiments to establish philosophical and broadly scientific conclusions.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Posterior Analytics 1.19-34 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Owen Goldin Marije MartijnAristotle described the scientific explanation of universal or general facts as deducing them through scientific demonstrations, that is, through syllogisms that met requirements of logical validity and explanatoriness which he first formulated. In Chapters 19-23, he adds arguments for the further logical restrictions that scientific demonstrations can neither be indefinitely long nor infinitely extendible through the interposition of new middle terms. Chapters 24-26 argue for the superiority of universal over particular demonstration, of affirmative over negative demonstration, and of direct negative demonstration over demonstration to the impossible. Chapters 27-34 discuss different aspects of sciences and scientific understanding, allowing us to distinguish between sciences, and between scientific understanding and other kinds of cognition, especially opinion. Philoponus' comments on these chapters are interesting especially because of his metaphysical analysis of universal predication and his understanding of the notion of subordinate sciences. We learn from his commentary that Philoponus believed in Platonic Forms as inherent in, and posterior to, the Divine Intellect, but ascribed to Aristotle an interpretation of Plato's Forms as independent substances, prior to the Demiurgic Intellect. A very important notion from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics is that of the 'subordination' of sciences, i.e. the idea that some sciences depend on 'higher' ones for some of their principles. Philoponus goes beyond Aristotle in suggesting a taxonomy of sciences, in which the subordinate science concerns the same scientific genus as the superordinate, but a different species.This volume contains the first English translation of Philoponus' commentary, as well as a detailed introduction, extensive explanatory notes and a bibliography.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 4.6-9 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Pamela HubyPhiloponus has been identified as the founder in dynamics of the theory of impetus, an inner force impressed from without, which, in its later recurrence, has been hailed as a scientific revolution. His commentary is translated here without the previously translated excursus, the Corollary on Void, also available in this series. Philoponus rejects Aristotle's attack on the very idea of void and of the possibility of motion in it, even though he thinks that void never occurs in fact. Philoponus' argument was later to be praised by Galileo.This volume contains the first English translation of Philoponus' commentary, as well as a detailed introduction, extensive explanatory notes and a bibliography.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 2 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by A. R. LaceyBook 2 of the Physics is arguably the best introduction to Aristotle's work, both because it explains some of his central concepts, such as nature and the four causes, and because it asks some gripping questions that are still debated today: Is chance something real? If so, what? Can nature be explained by chance, necessity and natural selection, or is it purposive?Philoponus' commentary is not only a valuable guide, but also a work of Neoplatonism with its own views on causation, the Providence of Nature, the problem of evil and the immortality of the soul.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 1.1-3 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Catherine OsborneUntil the launch of this series over fifteen years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. In this, the first half of Philoponus' analysis of book one of Aristotle's Physics, the principal themes are metaphysical. Aristotle's opening chapter in the Physics is an abstract reflection on methodology for the investigation of nature, or 'physics'. Aristotle suggests that one must proceed from things that are familiar but vague, and derive more precise but less obvious principles to constitute genuine knowledge. His controversial claim that this is to progress from the universal to the more particular occasions extensive apologetic exegesis, typical of Philoponus' meticulous and somewhat pedantic method. Philoponus explains away the apparent conflict between the 'didactic method' (unavoidable in physics) and the strict demonstrative method described in the Analytics. After 20 pages on Chapter 1, Philoponus devotes the remaining 66 pages to Aristotle's objections to two major Presocratic thinkers, Parmenides and Melissus. Aristotle included these thinkers as an aside, because they were not engaged in physics, but in questioning the very basis of physics. Philoponus investigates Aristotle's claims about the relation between a science and its axioms, explores alternative ways of formalising Aristotle's refutation of Eleatic monism and provides a sustained critique of Aristotle's analysis of the Eleatics' purported mistakes about unity and being.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Physics 4.10-14 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Philoponus Sarah BroadiePhiloponus' commentary on the last part of Aristotle's Physics Book 4 does not offer major alternatives to Aristotle's science, as did his commentary on the earlier parts, concerning place, vacuum and motion in a vacuum. Aristotle's subject here is time, and his treatment of it had led to controversy in earlier writers. Philoponus does offer novelties when he treats motion round a bend as in one sense faster than motion on the straight over the same distance in the same time, because of the need to consider the greater effort involved. And he points out that in an earlier commentary on Book 8 he had argued against Aristotle for the possibility of a last instant of time.This volume contains an English translation of Philoponus' commentary, as well as a detailed introduction, extensive explanatory notes and a bibliography.
Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 2.1-6 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Philoponus William CharltonIn On The Soul 2.1-6, Aristotle differs from Plato in his account of the soul, by tying it to the body. The soul is the life-manifesting capacities that we all have and that distinguish living things, and explain their behaviour. He defines soul and life by reference to the capacities for using food to maintain structure and reproduce, for perceiving and desiring, and for rational thought. Capacities have to be defined by reference to the objects to which they are directed. The five senses, for example, are defined by reference to their objects which are primarily forms like colour. And in perception we are said to receive these forms without matter. Philoponus understands this reception not physiologically as the eye jelly's taking on colour patches, but 'cognitively', like Brentano, who much later thought that Aristotle was treating the forms as intentional objects. Philoponus is the patron of non-physiological interpretations, which are still a matter of controversy today.
Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 2.7-12 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Philoponus William CharltonIn this, one of the most original ancient texts on sense perception, Philoponus, the sixth century AD commentator on Aristotle, considers how far perceptual processes are incorporeal. Colour affects us in the same way as light which, passing through a stained glass window, affects the air, but colours only the masonry beyond. Sounds and smells are somewhat more physical, travelling most of the way to us with a moving block of air, but not quite all the way. Only the organ of touch takes on the tangible qualities perceived, because reception of sensible qualities in perception is cognitive, not physical. Neither light nor the action of colour involves the travel of bodies. Our capacities for psychological activity do not follow, nor result from, the chemistry of our bodies, but merely supervene on that. On the other hand, Philoponus shows knowledge of the sensory nerves, and he believes that thought and anger both warm us. This argument is used elsewhere to show how we can tell someone else's state of mind.
Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Philoponus Philip J. EijkThis text by Philoponus, the sixth-century commentator on Aristotle, is notable for its informative introduction to psychology, which tells us the views of Philoponus, of his teacher and of later Neoplatonists on our psychological capacities and on mind-body relations. There is an unusual account of how reason can infer a universally valid conclusion from a single instance, and there are inherited views on the roles of intellect and perception in concept formation, and on the human ability to make reasoned decisions, celebrated by Aristotle, but here downgraded. Philoponus attacks Galen's view that psychological capacities follow, or result from, bodily chemistry; they merely supervene on that and can be counteracted. He has benefited from Galen's knowledge of the brain and nerves, but also propounds the Neoplatonist belief in tenuous bodies which after death support our irrational souls temporarily, or our reason eternally.
Philoponus: On Aristotle on the Soul 1.3-5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Philoponus Philip J. EijkUntil the launch of this series over fifteen years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. This text by Philoponus rejects accounts of soul, or as we would say of mind, which define it as moving, as cognitive, or in physical terms. Chapter 3 considers Aristotle's attack on the idea that the soul is in motion. This was an attack partly on his teacher, Plato, since Plato defines the soul as self-moving. Philoponus agrees with Aristotle's attack on the idea that a thing must be in motion in order to cause motion. But he offers what may be Ammonius' interpretation of Plato's apparently physicalistic account of the soul in the Timaeus as symbolic. What we would call the mind-body relation is the subject of Chapter 4. Plato and Aristotle attacked a physicalistic theory of soul, which suggested it was the blend, ratio, or harmonious proportion of ingredients in the body.Philoponus attacked the theory too, but we learn from him that Epicurus had defended it. In Chapter 5, Philoponus endorses Aristotle's rejection of the idea that the soul is particles and of Empedocles' idea that the soul must be made of all four elements in order to know what is made of the same elements. He also rejects, with Aristotle, definitions of the soul as moving or cognitive as ignoring lower forms of life. He finally discusses Aristotle's rejection of Plato's localisation of parts of the soul in parts of the body, but asks if new knowledge of the brain and the nerves do not require some kind of localisation.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Posterior Analytics 2 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Philoponus Owen GoldinThe Posterior Analytics contains Aristotle's philosophy of science. In Book 2, Aristotle asks how the scientist discovers what sort of loss of light constitutes lunar eclipse. The scientist has to discover that the moon's darkening is due to the earth's shadow. Once that defining explanation is known the scientist possesses the full scientific concept of lunar eclipse and can use it to explain other necessary features of the phenomenon. The present commentary, arguably ascribed to Philoponus incorrectly, offers some interpretations of Aristotle that are unfamiliar nowadays. For example, the scientific concept of a human is acquired from observing particular humans and repeatedly receiving impressions in the sense image or percept and later in the imagination. The impressions received are not only of particular distinctive characteristics, like paleness, but also of universal human characteristics, like rationality. Perception can thus in a sense apprehend universal qualities in the individual as well as particular ones. This volume contains an English translation of the commentary, accompanied by extensive commentary notes, an introduction and a bibliography.
Philoponus: On Aristotle On Coming to be and Perishing 2.5-11 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Philoponus Inna KupreevaUntil the launch of this series over ten years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. Subjects covered in this, the third and last, volume of translation of this work include: why the elements are four in number; what's wrong with Empedocles' theory of elements; how homogeneous stuffs, particularly the tissues of a living body, come to be and consist of the elements. The volume also contains very important discussions of causes, particularly of efficient cause, and of necessity in the sphere of generation and corruption. It is of interest to students of ancient philosophy and science (the commentary draws on earlier philosophical and medical texts); of Patristics and Christian Theology (it allows comparison of Philoponus' later creationist doctrine with his earlier ideas about generation); of medieval philosophy (this text was known to the Arabs; it is used by Avicenna and Averroes); and to anyone with interest in the metaphysics of causation, emergence, necessity and determinism.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Meteorology 1.4-9, 12 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Philoponus Inna KupreevaOf Philoponus' commentary on the Meteorology only that on chapters 1-9 and 12 of the first book has been preserved. It is translated in this series in two volumes, the first covering chapters 1-3; the second (this volume) chapters 4-9 and 12. The subjects discussed here include the nature of fiery and light phenomena in the sky, the formation of comets, the Milky Way, the properties of moist exhalation, and the formation of hail. Philoponus pays special attention to the distinction between the apparent and the real among the sky phenomena; he criticises Aristotle's theory of the Milky Way as sublunary, and argues for its origin in the heavenly realm; gives a detailed exposition of Aristotelian theory of antiperistasis, mutual replacement of the hot and the cold, as the mechanism of condensation and related processes. As in the first volume, Philoponus demonstrates scholarly erudition and familiarity with methods and results of post-Aristotelian Greek science. Despite the fragmented state of the work and the genre of commentary, the reader will find the elements of a coherent picture of the cosmos based on a radical re-thinking of Aristotelian meteorology and physics.
Philoponus: On Aristotle Meteorology 1.1-3 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)
by Philoponus Inna Kupreeva L. G. WesterinkAristotle's Meteorology influenced generations of speculation about the earth sciences, ranging from atmospheric phenomena to earthquakes. The commentary of John Philoponus (6th century AD) on the opening three chapters of Meteorology is here translated for the first time into English by Dr Inna Kupreeva, building on the work of L.G. Westerink. Philoponus, who today is increasingly respected as a philosopher in his own right, here engages critically with Aristotle's views about the building-blocks of our world, its size and relationship to other heavenly bodies, and reception of warmth from the sun. The translation in this volume is accompanied by a detailed introduction, extensive commentary notes and a bibliography.