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Spiritual Traditions and the Virtues: Living Between Heaven and Earth
by Mark R. WynnSpiritual Traditions and the Virtues develops a philosophical appreciation of the spiritual life. The book shows how a certain conception of spiritual good, one that is rooted in Thomas Aquinas's account of infused moral virtue, can generate a distinctive vision of human life and the possibilities for spiritual fulfilment. Wynn examines the character of the goods to which spiritual traditions are directed; the structure of such traditions, including the connection between their practical and creedal commitments; the relationship between the various vocabularies that are used to describe, from the insider's perspective, progress in the spiritual life; the significance of tradition as an epistemic category; and the question of what it takes for a spiritual tradition to be handed on from one person to another. In his account of the virtues, Aquinas shows how our relations to the everyday world can be folded into our relationship to the divine or sacred reality otherwise conceived. In this sense, he offers a vision of how it is possible to live between heaven and earth. Spiritual Traditions and the Virtues considers how that vision can be extended across the central domains of human thought and experience, and how it can deepen and diversify our understanding of what it is for a human life to be lived well.
Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition
by Elijah ChudnoffPerception and intuition are our basic sources of knowledge about the concrete world around us, and more abstract matters such as mathematics, metaphysics, and morality. Perception and intuition, however, are also capacities we deliberately improve in ways that draw on our knowledge about these domains. How can the sensory and intellectual impressions that lie at the foundation of our knowledge themselves be informed by our knowledge? In Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition, Chudnoff addresses this and other questions that derive from trying to understand the improvability of our basic sources of knowledge. At the extreme of improvement lies expertise, and there is a wealth of research on the structures and mechanisms underlying expert perception and expert intuition that promises to illuminate the nature and significance of improvements to these sources of knowledge in general. Taking this cue, the first part of the book lays the groundwork for the rest by elaborating an interpretation of the psychology of expertise. The second part develops a setting for thinking about the epistemology of expert perception and expert intuition. The third part of the book explores the significance of the resulting view of intuition and its improvability for recent debates about philosophical methodology. Chudnoff defends a rationalist view of the role of intuition in philosophy that can be traced back to classic works on methodology such as Descartes' Rules and Spinoza's Emendation of the Intellect.
Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition
by Elijah ChudnoffPerception and intuition are our basic sources of knowledge about the concrete world around us, and more abstract matters such as mathematics, metaphysics, and morality. Perception and intuition, however, are also capacities we deliberately improve in ways that draw on our knowledge about these domains. How can the sensory and intellectual impressions that lie at the foundation of our knowledge themselves be informed by our knowledge? In Forming Impressions: Expertise in Perception and Intuition, Chudnoff addresses this and other questions that derive from trying to understand the improvability of our basic sources of knowledge. At the extreme of improvement lies expertise, and there is a wealth of research on the structures and mechanisms underlying expert perception and expert intuition that promises to illuminate the nature and significance of improvements to these sources of knowledge in general. Taking this cue, the first part of the book lays the groundwork for the rest by elaborating an interpretation of the psychology of expertise. The second part develops a setting for thinking about the epistemology of expert perception and expert intuition. The third part of the book explores the significance of the resulting view of intuition and its improvability for recent debates about philosophical methodology. Chudnoff defends a rationalist view of the role of intuition in philosophy that can be traced back to classic works on methodology such as Descartes' Rules and Spinoza's Emendation of the Intellect.
Listening to Reason in Plato and Aristotle
by Dominic ScottFocusing on Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, this book compares their views on the persuasiveness of moral argument: how far did they think it could reach beyond a narrow circle of believers and influence people more generally? Answering this question requires a wide-ranging approach, which examines their views on such topics as rationality, moral psychology, rhetoric, education, and gender. The first part of the book shows that for Plato certain kinds of argument are beyond the reach of most people, specifically arguments that make appeal to transcendent Forms. But he still thought that there is another level of argument, restricted to human psychology and politics, which could have a much wider appeal, especially if supplemented by the appropriate rhetoric. The second half of the book turns to the Nicomachean Ethics to determine Aristotle's views about the reach of moral argument, as well as its purposes. He is certainly very restrictive when it comes to the kinds of argument pursued in the work itself, proposing to talk only to those who are mature in years and well brought up. Like Plato, however, he also allows for the possibility of another type of discourse, which is more rhetorical in nature and could benefit those who are less mature. Though mainly focused on the Republic and Nicomachean Ethics, this book also examines relevant passages from Plato's Laws and Aristotle's Politics.
Spinoza on Learning to Live Together
by Susan JamesPhilosophising, as Spinoza conceives it, is the project of learning to live joyfully. Yet this is also a matter of learning to live together, and the surest manifestation of philosophical insight is the capacity to sustain a harmonious way of life. Here, Susan James defends this overall interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy and explores its bearing on contemporary philosophical debates around issues such as religious toleration, putting our knowledge to work, and the environmental crisis. Part I focuses on Spinoza's epistemology. Philosophical understanding empowers us by giving us access to truths about ourselves and the world, and by motivating us to act on them. It gives us reasons for living together and enhances our ability to live co-operatively. Part II takes up Spinoza's claim that, to cultivate this kind of understanding, we need to live together in political communities. It explores his analysis of how states can develop a co-operative ethos. Finally, living joyfully compels us to look beyond the state to our relationship with the rest of nature. James concludes with discussions of some of the virtues this requires.
The Epistemology of Fake News (Engaging Philosophy)
News is vital for a healthy democracy. Collective decision-making requires accurate, reliable information. Nevertheless, much of the information we encounter is inadequate for this task. And some—peddled by politicians, profiteers, bots and algorithms—is fake. Social media platforms and emerging technologies allow fake news to dominate our information landscape. An adequate understanding our current information landscape calls for a new discipline, the epistemology of fake news. The epistemology of fake news studies knowledge communication under imperfect conditions. This book is the first sustained inquiry into the new epistemology of fake news. The chapters, authored by established and emerging names in the field, pursue three goals. First, to analyse the meaning and novelty of 'fake news' and related notions, such as 'conspiracy theory.' Second, to discuss the mechanics of fake news, exploring various practices that generate or promote fake news. Third, to investigate potential therapies for fake news.
The Epistemology of Fake News (Engaging Philosophy)
by Sven Bernecker Amy K. Flowerree Thomas GrundmannNews is vital for a healthy democracy. Collective decision-making requires accurate, reliable information. Nevertheless, much of the information we encounter is inadequate for this task. And some—peddled by politicians, profiteers, bots and algorithms—is fake. Social media platforms and emerging technologies allow fake news to dominate our information landscape. An adequate understanding our current information landscape calls for a new discipline, the epistemology of fake news. The epistemology of fake news studies knowledge communication under imperfect conditions. This book is the first sustained inquiry into the new epistemology of fake news. The chapters, authored by established and emerging names in the field, pursue three goals. First, to analyse the meaning and novelty of 'fake news' and related notions, such as 'conspiracy theory.' Second, to discuss the mechanics of fake news, exploring various practices that generate or promote fake news. Third, to investigate potential therapies for fake news.
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
by Lisa BortolottiIn an ideal world, our beliefs would satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as foster the acquisition, retention, and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis. We may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, and beliefs that are elaborated delusional, motivated delusional, or optimistically biased. In this book, Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where, in some contexts, the adoption, maintenance, or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs, yet it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade-off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness, which in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
by Lisa BortolottiIn an ideal world, our beliefs would satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as foster the acquisition, retention, and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis. We may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, and beliefs that are elaborated delusional, motivated delusional, or optimistically biased. In this book, Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where, in some contexts, the adoption, maintenance, or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs, yet it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade-off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness, which in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.
Beyond the Learned Academy: The Practice of Mathematics, 1600-1850
The tremendous growth of the mathematical sciences in the early modern world was reflected contemporaneously in an increasingly sophisticated level of practical mathematics in fields such as merchants' accounts, instrument making, teaching, navigation, and gauging. In many ways, mathematics shaped the knowledge culture of the age, infiltrating workshops, dockyards, and warehouses, before extending through the factories of the Industrial Revolution to the trading companies and banks of the nineteenth century. While theoretical developments in the history of mathematics have been made the topic of numerous scholarly investigations, in many cases based around the work of key figures such as Descartes, Huygens, Leibniz, or Newton, practical mathematics, especially from the seventeenth century onwards, has been largely neglected. The present volume, comprising fifteen essays by leading authorities in the history of mathematics, seeks to fill this gap by exemplifying the richness, diversity, and breadth of mathematical practice from the seventeenth century through to the middle of the nineteenth century.
Beyond the Learned Academy: The Practice of Mathematics, 1600-1850
by Philip BeeleyThe tremendous growth of the mathematical sciences in the early modern world was reflected contemporaneously in an increasingly sophisticated level of practical mathematics in fields such as merchants' accounts, instrument making, teaching, navigation, and gauging. In many ways, mathematics shaped the knowledge culture of the age, infiltrating workshops, dockyards, and warehouses, before extending through the factories of the Industrial Revolution to the trading companies and banks of the nineteenth century. While theoretical developments in the history of mathematics have been made the topic of numerous scholarly investigations, in many cases based around the work of key figures such as Descartes, Huygens, Leibniz, or Newton, practical mathematics, especially from the seventeenth century onwards, has been largely neglected. The present volume, comprising fifteen essays by leading authorities in the history of mathematics, seeks to fill this gap by exemplifying the richness, diversity, and breadth of mathematical practice from the seventeenth century through to the middle of the nineteenth century.
Non-Identity Theodicy: A Grace-Based Response to the Problem of Evil (Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs)
by Vince R. VitaleThis is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Questions as personal as those about suffering require a very personal response. However, the most popular responses to "the problem of evil" revolve around abstract discussions of greater goods, maximization of value, and best possible worlds, depicting God as at best an impartial bureaucrat and at worst a utility fanatic, rather than as a loving parent concerned first and foremost for his children. Vince R. Vitale develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. He begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. The book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Vitale then critiques theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons—for they would not exist otherwise, but it is the individual human persons themselves.
Non-Identity Theodicy: A Grace-Based Response to the Problem of Evil (Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs)
by Vince R. VitaleThis is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Questions as personal as those about suffering require a very personal response. However, the most popular responses to "the problem of evil" revolve around abstract discussions of greater goods, maximization of value, and best possible worlds, depicting God as at best an impartial bureaucrat and at worst a utility fanatic, rather than as a loving parent concerned first and foremost for his children. Vince R. Vitale develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. He begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. The book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Vitale then critiques theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons—for they would not exist otherwise, but it is the individual human persons themselves.
Quine, Structure, and Ontology (Mind Association Occasional Series)
W.V. Quine, a champion of philosophical naturalism and pioneer of mathematical logic, was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Contemporary thought in ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic and language owes much to his influence, yet recent work in these areas has become increasingly dismissive of his views. This is often because of mistaken or overly simplified conceptions of his philosophy which overlook the development of his views over time, in particular the growing importance of a kind of structuralism to his system as it evolved. This volume provides a fuller, richer picture of Quine's views and their development. With contributions from leading philosophers in a range of subfields including philosophical logic, philosophy of language, history of philosophy, mathematics, philosophy of time, and set theory, it is the first to investigate Quine's views on structure and how it permeates and shapes his attitude to a range of philosophical questions.
Quine, Structure, and Ontology (Mind Association Occasional Series)
by Frederique Janssen-LauretW.V. Quine, a champion of philosophical naturalism and pioneer of mathematical logic, was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Contemporary thought in ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic and language owes much to his influence, yet recent work in these areas has become increasingly dismissive of his views. This is often because of mistaken or overly simplified conceptions of his philosophy which overlook the development of his views over time, in particular the growing importance of a kind of structuralism to his system as it evolved. This volume provides a fuller, richer picture of Quine's views and their development. With contributions from leading philosophers in a range of subfields including philosophical logic, philosophy of language, history of philosophy, mathematics, philosophy of time, and set theory, it is the first to investigate Quine's views on structure and how it permeates and shapes his attitude to a range of philosophical questions.
Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics
New Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics offers a new agenda for work where these three disciplines meet. It showcases three generations of scholars—from newly minted professors to some of today's most distinguished thinkers. Consisting of fifteen conversations, pairs of chapters dedicated to a single topic, the volume provides intergenerational and multidisciplinary perspectives on aspects of our social world. Each conversation comprises a first paper by a scholar who sets the topic, followed by a second paper by a scholar of a different generation, and usually a different discipline, who offers further insight or commentary. Each conversation thus provides two sets of original thoughts about a matter of lively current interest and interdisciplinary significance. Topics investigated include moral revolutions, AI and democracy, trust and the rule of law, responsibility, praise and blame, reasonableness, duty, political obligation, justice and equality, justice and intersectionality, domination, pornography, intentions in the law, and legal argumentation. Written in clear prose, the volume is accessible by philosophers, lawyers, political theorists, and beyond.
Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics
by Ruth Chang Amia SrinivasanNew Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics offers a new agenda for work where these three disciplines meet. It showcases three generations of scholars—from newly minted professors to some of today's most distinguished thinkers. Consisting of fifteen conversations, pairs of chapters dedicated to a single topic, the volume provides intergenerational and multidisciplinary perspectives on aspects of our social world. Each conversation comprises a first paper by a scholar who sets the topic, followed by a second paper by a scholar of a different generation, and usually a different discipline, who offers further insight or commentary. Each conversation thus provides two sets of original thoughts about a matter of lively current interest and interdisciplinary significance. Topics investigated include moral revolutions, AI and democracy, trust and the rule of law, responsibility, praise and blame, reasonableness, duty, political obligation, justice and equality, justice and intersectionality, domination, pornography, intentions in the law, and legal argumentation. Written in clear prose, the volume is accessible by philosophers, lawyers, political theorists, and beyond.
Virtual Subjects, Fugitive Selves: Fernando Pessoa and his philosophy
by Jonardon GaneriThis book is a sustained analytical exploration of the rich philosophy of self of the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa. Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935) has become many things to many people in the years that have passed since his untimely death. For some he is simply the greatest Portuguese poet of the 20th century. For others he has gradually emerged as a forgotten voice in 20th century modernism. And yet Pessoa was also a philosopher, and it is only very recently that the philosophical importance of his work has begun to attract the attention it deserves. Pessoa composed systematic philosophical essays in his pre-heteronymic period, defending rationalism in epistemology and sensationism in the philosophy of mind. His heteronymic work, decisively breaking with the conventional strictures of systematic philosophical writing, is a profound and exquisite exploration in the philosophy of self. Virtual Subjects, Fugitive Selves pulls together the strands of this philosophy and rearticulates it in a way that does justice to its breathtaking originality. It reveals the extraordinary power of Pessoa's theory by applying it to the analysis of some of the trickiest and most puzzling problems about the self to have appeared in the global history of philosophy.
Virtual Subjects, Fugitive Selves: Fernando Pessoa and his philosophy
by Jonardon GaneriThis book is a sustained analytical exploration of the rich philosophy of self of the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa. Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935) has become many things to many people in the years that have passed since his untimely death. For some he is simply the greatest Portuguese poet of the 20th century. For others he has gradually emerged as a forgotten voice in 20th century modernism. And yet Pessoa was also a philosopher, and it is only very recently that the philosophical importance of his work has begun to attract the attention it deserves. Pessoa composed systematic philosophical essays in his pre-heteronymic period, defending rationalism in epistemology and sensationism in the philosophy of mind. His heteronymic work, decisively breaking with the conventional strictures of systematic philosophical writing, is a profound and exquisite exploration in the philosophy of self. Virtual Subjects, Fugitive Selves pulls together the strands of this philosophy and rearticulates it in a way that does justice to its breathtaking originality. It reveals the extraordinary power of Pessoa's theory by applying it to the analysis of some of the trickiest and most puzzling problems about the self to have appeared in the global history of philosophy.
Guided by Voices: Moral Testimony, Advice, and Forging a 'We'
by Eric WilandWe often rely on others for guidance about what to do. But wouldn't it be better to rely instead on only your own solo judgment? Deferring to others about moral matters, after all, can seem to conflict what Enlightenment demands. In Guided by Voices, however, Eric Wiland argues that there is nothing especially bad about relying on others in forming your moral views. You may rely on others for forming your moral views, just as you can your views about anything else. You can accept moral testimony without loss. Furthermore, there are several distinctive social goods attainable by being guided by what others say. Thus, it can be better to be guided by moral testimony than by your own moral lights. Wiland also argues that relying on others for moral advice has one advantage over relying on others for moral testimony. For when you trust your adviser's advice, you both thereby form a joint agent that can achieve autonomy, moral understanding, and morally worthy action. Sometimes taking another's advice is your only way to act well. Arguing against the presumption that moral reasoning is ideally done alone, Guided by Voices is the first book to address moral testimony and advice.
Guided by Voices: Moral Testimony, Advice, and Forging a 'We'
by Eric WilandWe often rely on others for guidance about what to do. But wouldn't it be better to rely instead on only your own solo judgment? Deferring to others about moral matters, after all, can seem to conflict what Enlightenment demands. In Guided by Voices, however, Eric Wiland argues that there is nothing especially bad about relying on others in forming your moral views. You may rely on others for forming your moral views, just as you can your views about anything else. You can accept moral testimony without loss. Furthermore, there are several distinctive social goods attainable by being guided by what others say. Thus, it can be better to be guided by moral testimony than by your own moral lights. Wiland also argues that relying on others for moral advice has one advantage over relying on others for moral testimony. For when you trust your adviser's advice, you both thereby form a joint agent that can achieve autonomy, moral understanding, and morally worthy action. Sometimes taking another's advice is your only way to act well. Arguing against the presumption that moral reasoning is ideally done alone, Guided by Voices is the first book to address moral testimony and advice.
The Practical Self
by Prof Anil GomesWe are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects such as us must be related to an objective world. Philosophers in the twentieth century were less ambitious: self-conscious subjects must only think or experience the world as objective. The Practical Self argues that the answer to our question lies in a set of enigmatic remarks by the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. 'One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning', Lichtenberg writes. 'To say cogito is already too much To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.' Lichtenberg is raising a puzzle here about our grounds for recognising ourselves as the agents of our thinking. Its solution is to understand that we have practical grounds to think of ourselves as the intellectual agents. We are thus practical selves: intellectual agents who have distinctively practical grounds to recognise ourselves as such. And our faith in ourselves as practical selves is sustained through interaction with others. The argument of this book is that self-consciousness requires faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking and that this faith is sustained by a practices which relate us to other thinkers. Self-consciousness connects us to a world of others.
The Practical Self
by Prof Anil GomesWe are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects such as us must be related to an objective world. Philosophers in the twentieth century were less ambitious: self-conscious subjects must only think or experience the world as objective. The Practical Self argues that the answer to our question lies in a set of enigmatic remarks by the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. 'One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning', Lichtenberg writes. 'To say cogito is already too much To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.' Lichtenberg is raising a puzzle here about our grounds for recognising ourselves as the agents of our thinking. Its solution is to understand that we have practical grounds to think of ourselves as the intellectual agents. We are thus practical selves: intellectual agents who have distinctively practical grounds to recognise ourselves as such. And our faith in ourselves as practical selves is sustained through interaction with others. The argument of this book is that self-consciousness requires faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking and that this faith is sustained by a practices which relate us to other thinkers. Self-consciousness connects us to a world of others.
Beyond Chance and Credence: A Theory of Hybrid Probabilities
by Wayne C. MyrvoldConcepts related to probability permeate physics. This is most obvious in statistical mechanics, in which probabilities appear explicitly, but even in cases when predictions are made with near-certainty, there are implicit probabilistic assumptions in play. How are we to understand these probabilistic concepts? How do they apply to the physical world? Beyond Chance and Credence offers a fresh look at these familiar topics, urging readers to see them in a new light. The book provides an overview of the history of philosophical debates about the nature of probability over the last three centuries, and clear and accessible introductions to conceptual issues in probability theory, thermodynamics, and statistical mechanics. Myrvold argues that the traditional choice between probabilities as objective chances or else as degrees of belief is too limiting, and introduces a new concept, epistemic chances, that combines physical and epistemic considerations. He goes on to show that conceiving of probabilities in this way solves some of the puzzles associated with the use of probability and statistical mechanics. The result is an innovative perspective on one of the most central topics in the philosophy of science.
Good Lives: Autobiography, Self-Knowledge, Narrative, and Self-Realization
by Samuel ClarkReasoning with autobiography is a way to self-knowledge. We can learn about ourselves, as human beings and as individuals, by reading, thinking through, and arguing about this distinctive kind of text. Reasoning with Edmund Gosse's Father and Son is a way of learning about the nature of the good life and the roles that pleasure and self-expression can play in it. Reasoning with Siegfried Sassoon's Memoirs is a way of learning about transformative experience, self-alienation, and therefore the nature of the self. Good Lives: Autobiography, Self-Knowledge, Narrative, and Self-Realization develops this claim by answering a series of questions: What is an autobiography? How can we learn about ourselves from reading one? On what subjects does autobiography teach? What should we learn about them? In particular, given that autobiographies are narratives, should we learn something about the importance of narrative in human life? Could our storytelling about our own lives make sense of them as wholes, unify them over time, or make them good for us? Could storytelling make the self? Samuel Clark provides an authoritative critique of narrative and a defence of a self-realization account of the self and its good. He investigates the wide range of extant accounts of the self and of the good life, and defends pluralist realism about self-knowledge by reading and reasoning with autobiographies of self-discovery, martial life, and solitude. The volume concludes by showing that autobiography can be reasoning in pursuit of self-knowledge; each of us is an unchosen, initially opaque, seedlike self; our good is the development and expression of our latent capacities, which is our individual self-realization; and self-narration plays much less role in our lives than some thinkers have supposed, and the development and expression of potential much more.